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Abstract
Background: A motivated workforce is necessary to ensure the delivery of high quality health services. In developing 
countries, performance-based financing (PBF) is often employed to increase motivation by providing financial incentives 
linked to performance. However, given PBF schemes are usually funded by donors, their long-term financing is not 
always assured, and the effects of withdrawing PBF on motivation are largely unknown. This cross-sectional study aimed 
to identify differences in motivation between workers who recently had donor-funded PBF withdrawn, with workers 
who had not received PBF. 
Methods: Quantitative data were collected from 485 health workers in 5 provinces using a structured survey containing 
questions on motivation which were based on an established motivation framework. Confirmatory factor analysis was 
used to verify dimensions of motivation, and multiple regression to assess differences in motivation scores between 
workers who had previously received PBF and those who never had. Qualitative interviews were also carried out in Kasai 
Occidental province with 16 nurses who had previously or never received PBF. 
Results: The results indicated that workers in facilities where PBF had been removed scored significantly lower on 
most dimensions of motivation compared to workers who had never received PBF. The removal of the PBF scheme was 
blamed for an exodus of staff due to the dramatic reduction in income, and negatively impacted on relationships between 
staff and the local community. 
Conclusion: Donors and governments unable to sustain PBF or other donor-payments should have clear exit strategies 
and institute measures to mitigate any adverse effects on motivation following withdrawal.
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Implications for policy makers
• This research indicates that the withdrawal of donor-funded payments may have harmful repercussions for health worker motivation and 
service delivery.
• Programmes unable to sustain donor-funded payments to health workers should develop realistic exit strategies and institute measures to 
mitigate against any adverse effects on motivation prior to withdrawal. 
• Governments and donors designing new performance-based financing (PBF) schemes or programmes involving supplemental payments to 
workers should consider whether the short-term advantages of introducing additional health worker payments outweigh the potential adverse 
long-term consequences in the event that donor financing ceases. 
Implications for the public
This research has demonstrated the potential negative implications for health worker motivation when donor-funded payments provided through 
a performance-based financing (PBF) scheme are withdrawn. PBF is increasingly being employed by the international community as a mechanism 
to enhance worker motivation and performance in fragile settings. However, the long-term funding for PBF is not always guaranteed. This study 
warrants consideration by those either designing or considering how to exit from a PBF scheme or programme administering supplemental payments 
to workers.
Key Messages 
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Background
Human resources for health are one of the core pillars of 
health systems,1 and the performance of health workers 
directly affects the quality of health services. Knowledge and 
competency are not the only influences of health worker 
performance.2,3 Studies have confirmed that there are 
differences in practice between what health workers “know” 
should be performed, and what they actually “do,” and this is 
termed the “know-do” gap.4 Alongside other factors including 
enabling working conditions, motivation is thought to be one 
bridge in overcoming this gap,5 and is often defined as the 
“degree of willingness of an individual to exert and maintain 
an effort towards attaining organisational goals.”6 
In developing countries, health workers face many 
challenges to delivering services, including inadequate 
resources, supervision and training. In such settings, highly 
motivated workers will attempt to overcome such obstacles in 
order to be as productive as possible. Addressing poor health 
worker motivation can therefore lead to significant gains in 
efficiency and performance.7-9
One way of influencing motivation is through incentives, 
which may be financial or non-financial. Financial incentives 
are monetary rewards given to a worker,10 while non-
financial incentives include: career development, resource 
availability, hospital management, supervisory support 
and recognition.11-14 With respect to financial incentives, 
performance-based financing (PBF) can be employed, 
and involves the transfer of funds (either totally or in part) 
to health workers based on their attaining a pre-defined 
level of performance. However, while PBF is expected to 
increase motivation and therefore effort, in some low-income 
countries and fragile states, the effects of introducing PBF 
upon motivation have produced mixed results; workers in 
Rwanda reported increased levels of motivation under a PBF 
scheme,15,16 while a study in Afghanistan indicated that PBF 
did not have a bearing on motivation and performance.17 
In Malawi, PBF appeared to impact upon health worker 
motivation through different mechanisms, for example 
by improving their working environment.18 The authors 
recommended PBF schemes should be designed and 
implemented in anticipation of the different ways they will 
influence motivation, in order to ensure effects on motivation 
can be maximised.18,19
Donors often initially fund PBF in low-income country 
settings. According to the World Bank’s Results Based 
Financing for health website, the Health Results and 
Innovation Trust Fund has committed US$385.6 million to 
funding PBF programmes in 29 countries, which is linked to 
US$2 billion in financing from the International Development 
Association.20 Yet, with the exception of a few countries 
including Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Burundi,21-23 
the availability of government financing to take over such 
donor-funded schemes is not always assured. The volatility 
and unreliability of foreign financing could leave developing 
countries vulnerable if donors were to withdraw their aid. 
Given financing is not always secure, knowledge of the 
implications of terminating such donor-funded payments 
is urgently needed to counteract any potentially harmful 
consequences for health worker motivation. To date, the 
authors are only aware of one study which was undertaken 
by Huillery and Seban,16 that examined the withdrawal of 
donor-funding in a low-income country which was the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It compared health 
worker motivation between 2 groups – one receiving an 
exclusively performance-based payment, and the other group 
receiving a fixed payment of the same amount. The findings 
indicated that the motivation of workers was higher under the 
performance payment compared to the fixed payment, but 
following the removal of both payments, worker motivation 
was lower in the group which had received the performance 
payment. The study further found that the previous PBF 
group placed greater importance on financial motives than on 
non-material motives compared to the fixed payment group, 
which could not be attributed to a decrease in worker income.
Our study goes beyond the work undertaken by Huillery 
and Seban in that it examines differences observed across 
a vast range of dimensions of motivation between 2 groups 
of health workers; one group who recently experienced the 
removal of a donor-funded PBF scheme (comprising of both 
a fixed and variable payment related to performance) and 
another group of workers who were not exposed to PBF. The 
study also qualitatively explores how the withdrawal of PBF 
affected health workers, and reasons behind any differences 
identified between the 2 groups. 
Study Setting
Like many fragile states, the DRC struggles to provide basic 
healthcare to its citizens.24 Despite the domestic health budget 
mainly serving to finance health workers, few public sector 
health workers receive their government salary at all.25,26 
Consequently, several donors have implemented PBF in an 
attempt to motivate the health workforce and enhance quality 
of care.27
Between 2008 and 2013, the Department for International 
Development (DFID) provided funding to 2 international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to support health 
centres and hospitals to deliver a package of basic primary 
health services. The programme was called Access To 
Healthcare (ATH), and was implemented in 20 health zones 
in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Province Orientale, 
Maniema, and South Kivu in the DRC[1]. The programme 
heavily subsidised user fees and additionally implemented 
PBF, involving monthly supplemental fixed payments to public 
sector health workers of $75 plus a monthly performance-
based payment ($25). Facilities were scored against a series of 
quantitative performance targets, for example the attainment 
of 80% coverage for assisted births. Workers only received the 
performance payment if their facility achieved above a certain 
total score. Verification of performance was conducted by 
the implementing partners, who compared reported health 
service indicators with those found in health facility registers, 
and also visited a sample of patients recorded on the register 
to cross-check accuracy of information. 
At the end of ATH in March 2013, DFID commenced 
a follow-on programme called Accès Aux Soins de Santé 
Primaire (Access to Primary Health Care or ASSP) in a total 
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of 56 health zones – the 20 health zones of ATH, and a further 
11 zones in Equateur and 25 zones in Kasai Occidental 
(Figure 1).
The ASSP programme continues to support the provision 
of essential primary health services. However, during the first 
year of ASSP, PBF (both the supplemental fixed payment and 
performance payment) to health workers was phased out in the 
20 health zones of the previous ATH programme by $25 every 
3 months. Firstly, the $25 performance-based component of 
the payment was withdrawn 3 months after the start of the 
new ASSP programme (in July 2013). Then the fixed income 
component was reduced by $25 every 3 months thereafter, so 
all donor-funded payments to workers had ended by March 
2014. Therefore, after 5 years of implementation under ATH, 
PBF was removed in a structured and gradual way under the 
successor programme ASSP. This occurred in tandem with a 
marginal increase in the user fee tariff, in an effort to help 
substitute health workers’ loss of revenue. 
Conceptual Framework
Over 70 years of research particularly in psychology and 
behavioural economics have led to numerous definitions, 
theories, and taxonomies of motivation in general and 
work motivation in specific.28 Motivation is usually viewed 
as a complex, multi-dimensional construct. For instance, 
motivation is often distinguished into different forms by its 
drivers (eg, extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation28,29; Hackman 
and Oldham’s Job Characteristics Model)30 or by its locus 
of causality (Self-Determination Theory).31 Other theories 
such as goal setting theory are concerned with individuals’ 
cognitive processes leading to motivated behaviour, it’s 
direction, intensity, and duration.28 Along with this variety 
of conceptualisations, numerous motivation measurement 
tools have been developed and validated, attempting to 
capture motivation either by asking directly about, or by 
asking about or observing proxies (eg, asking for factors 
assumed to be closely associated with motivation, such as 
working conditions; observing behaviours assumed to be the 
consequence of motivation).32,33 
In low- and middle-income country (LMIC) health 
systems, interest in understanding the work motivation 
of the healthcare workforce is recent, but more and more 
studies are being conducted and published.18,19,34-39 Motivation 
researchers in LMICs struggle not only with the many 
available conceptualisations and measures, but also with the 
fact that very few have been validated and/or customised to 
the specific cultural contexts and work settings.33 Notable 
exceptions include a Self-Determination Theory-based 
psychometric scale,36 as well as the Franco framework.8,40,41 
The Franco framework, which was also used in this study, 
is to date the most widely used framework in the current 
body of literature on work motivation of health workers in 
LMICs and captures motivation indirectly through various 
assumed motivational determinants and consequences at 
the individual, organisational and societal level (Figure 2). 
These determinants are described as either affecting the “will-
do” component of motivation, the alignment of individual’s 
goals to that of the organisation, or the “can-do” component 
of motivation, which refers to the ability of the individual to 
mobilise resources to execute a task. Individual motivation 
outcomes are the result of the interaction between the “can-
do” and “will-do” components of motivation, and can be 
affective, cognitive and behavioural. Affective outcomes 
concern health workers’ satisfaction, cognitive outcomes relate 
to health workers’ perceptions of their job, and behavioural 
outcomes relate to the performance of health workers. This 
study conceptualises motivation according to the Franco 
framework, measuring the impact of PBF withdrawal on 
various motivational determinants and consequences. In the 
following sections, we use the term ‘dimensions’ to refer to 
Figure 1. Health Zones in the DRC Supported by Different Health Programmes Funded by DFID. Abbreviations: ASSP, Access to Primary Healthcare (2013-2018); 
ATH, Access to Healthcare (2008-2013); DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo; DFID, Department for International Development.
20 health zones supported previously 
by ATH and now ASSP
36 additional ASSP zones
South Kivu
Maniema
Province OrientaleEquateur
Kasai Occidental
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the individual-level determinants and consequences through 
which motivation is defined and measured in the Franco 
framework.
Methods
The study employed a mixed methods triangulation design. 
In line with Creswell and colleagues,42,43 we use the term 
triangulation to refer to the use of different methods of data 
collection and analysis to explore different aspects of the 
‘phenomenon.’ Specifically, we use quantitative methods to 
quantify motivational factors, and qualitative methods to 
elucidate the reasons why there may have been differences 
in motivation scores between health workers who had 
previously been exposed to PBF and health workers who had 
not been exposed. Quantitative data were collected through a 
health worker survey and allowed a comparison of scores on 
motivation dimensions between workers who had experienced 
PBF withdrawal with workers who had never received PBF; in 
other words, those who had been working in ATH areas prior 
to ASSP (previous PBF group) with workers who had not been 
covered by the ATH programme (non-PBF group). This latter 
group included workers covered by the ASSP programme as 
well as those working in non-ASSP health zones to enable a 
larger sample for comparison, and implementation of ASSP 
was still at an early stage. Qualitative data were collected using 
semi-structured interviews. Triangulation of quantitative and 
qualitative findings occurred at the interpretative stage. 
Quantitative Data
Using Franco’s framework,6 dimensions of motivation 
were identified. To identify questionnaire items to measure 
each dimension, an extensive review of health worker 
motivation surveys was performed and appropriate items 
collected.11,39,41,44-53 Identified items and dimensions were 
discussed with development partners to confirm the selection 
was relevant to the setting. However, it was not possible to 
cover all specified dimensions of motivation according to the 
Franco framework given other competing priorities of the 
health worker survey. As a result, we had to be conservative 
on the number of questions and therefore dimensions of 
motivation that we could measure. The final dimensions 
selected were those deemed to be of greatest importance and 
applicability to the DRC context. 
The final questions were then incorporated into the health 
worker survey, which also gathered demographic information 
on health workers, including: age, gender, cadre, educational 
attainment, number of years worked, and number of financial 
dependents. Small revisions were made following a pre-test of 
the survey in 2 non-study facilities in Kinshasa and a facility in 
Bas-Congo. All items were answered on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with certain question responses worded “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree” and others worded “very dissatisfied” to 
“very satisfied.” The response “not applicable” was included 
for items where it was possible the question was not relevant. 
Sampling
The surveys were undertaken as part of a baseline evaluation 
of ASSP.54 Province Orientale and Maniema were combined 
to form one sampling domain, Kasai Occidental and Kasai 
Oriental formed another, and Equateur was its own sampling 
domain. 105 primary care facilities in ASSP areas were 
randomly sampled and matched with 105 facilities on urban/
rural status and catchment population size in areas where 
ASSP was not operational (35 intervention and 35 control 
facilities in each sampling domain). Therefore, although this 
study was nested within the ASSP baseline evaluation, the 
sampling of facilities and workers had not taken into account 
coverage of the previous ATH programme ie, whether 
workers belonged to the “previous PBF group” or “non-PBF 
group.” This latter group included workers working in non-
ASSP health zones as well as ASSP zones which had not been 
covered by ATH. As a result, there was an imbalance in the 
final sample of former PBF workers compared to non-PBF 
workers, with a far greater number of the latter. For this study, 
Figure 2. Franco’s Conceptual Framework of Motivational Determinants, Outcomes and Consequences. Source Franco et al.40
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the intervention group was workers in ASSP that had received 
PBF, and the comparison group were workers (ASSP or non-
ASSP) who had not received PBF. Figure 3 illustrates the 
results of facility sampling by PBF status.
All workers providing clinical services and on duty on the 
day of the survey were interviewed from sampled facilities. 
The head of the facility also completed a facility survey to 
determine the total number of staff, population served, and 
the number of services provided at the facility. 
Data were collected between April and May 2014, which 
meant that any workers sampled in the previous PBF group had 
stopped receiving any donor-funded payments for at least one 
month. The Kinshasa School of Public Health in collaboration 
with Tulane University hired and trained data collectors from 
each of the sampled provinces to administer the surveys. 
Data collectors explained the purpose, confidentiality and 
anonymity of the study to each health worker in obtaining 
informed consent to participate in the survey. 
Statistical Analyses
Survey data were double-entered into the computer database 
CSPro for verification before being imported into and analysed 
in Stata 13 and R 3.4.2 statistical software. Descriptive statistics 
were used to explore the demographic characteristics of health 
workers and facility characteristics overall, and differences 
between the previous and non-PBF groups assessed using 
chi-square and t tests. For the motivation dimensions, 
psychometric item analysis, examining item distributions, 
summary statistics, and correlation patterns, was undertaken 
in Stata 13 for both the overall sample and the previous PBF 
and non-PBF subgroups (see Supplementary file 1, Table S1). 
Items which clearly did not correspond well with the other 
items pertaining to their intended dimension were dropped 
(see Supplementary file 2, Table S2). The final 11 motivation 
dimensions, along with hypotheses on how PBF withdrawal 
may affect these, are listed in Table 1. 
Prior to the analysis, in the few cases where individuals 
missed a response to an item, missing responses were replaced 
by imputation of the median value of their responses to other 
items pertaining to the same dimension. Confirmatory 
factor analysis, which was carried out in R 3.4.2 using a 
robust maximum likelihood estimator, indicated a good 
model fit for the 11-factor model (χ2 (476) = 816, P = .000; 
RMSEA = 0.040, P(RMSEA<.05) = 1.000; CFI = 0.902; 
SRMR = 0.045), confirming that the 34 motivation-related 
items measured the 11 motivation dimensions as intended. 
Cronbach alpha was greater than 0.60 for all dimensions with 
3 or more items. Factors with more than one item were also 
tested for measurement invariance across both PBF groups. 
Measurement invariance testing aims to confirm that the scale 
has the same measurement properties in different subsamples 
and scores can therefore meaningfully be compared across 
samples. Establishing measurement invariance involves 
a hierarchy of testing, which include tests of weak and 
strong invariance.69 Strong invariance was identified for the 
dimensions: ‘conscientiousness,’ ‘pride’ and ‘training,’ weak 
invariance for ‘organisational culture’ and ‘tasks,’ while only 
‘availability of equipment/supplies’ and ‘income reflects 
effort’ were not invariant and differences between subsamples 
therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
Scores for each dimension were then calculated as 
unweighted means of responses to items within each 
dimension, as within each dimension, item-factor loadings 
were of approximately the same magnitude. Multiple linear 
regression models with an ordinary least squares estimator 
as the standard were used to test for significant differences 
in motivation scores between workers from the non-PBF 
group and workers in the previous PBF group, controlling 
for health worker and facility characteristics including: age, 
gender, health worker cadre, education, years worked in 
current position, location, type of facility, number of services 
provided, and presence of the ASSP programme. Table S3 in 
Supplementary file 3 indicates how different characteristics 
may have influenced motivation scores, based on the global 
Figure 3. Diagram Showing Sampling of Facilities Under the Baseline Evaluation and the Selection of Intervention and Comparison Groups for This Study.  Abbreviations: 
ASSP,  Access to Primary Healthcare (2013-2018);  ATH, Access to Healthcare (2008-2013); PBF, Performance-based financing.
* Some surveyed facilities dropped as health workers did not meet inclusion criteria. 
Proposed sample
Number of facilities 
sampled meeting 
inclusion criteria*
105 ASSP facilities (includes 
previous PBF and non-PBF)
105 non ASSP facilities
(all non-PBF)
101 ASSP facilities 101 non ASSP facilities
65 non-PBF facilities
(124 health workers)
INTERVENTION
36 previous PBF facilities
(118 health workers)
101 non-PBF facilities
(211 health workers)
Number of facilities 
sampled by PBF status
COMPARISON
166 non-PBF facilities
(335 health workers)
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Table 1. Final Motivation Dimensions, Link to Franco Framework, and Hypothesis on how PBF Removal May Affect Dimensions
Link to Franco Framework Dimension (Link to Franco Framework) Description of Dimension
How Expected Withdrawal of 
the Donor-Funded Payment 
May Affect Dimension
Rationale No. of Items
Determinants 
of motivation
Individual-level
Conscientious-
ness (affective 
motivation)
Perception of level of discipline, effort 
and care put into work
Decrease
The introduction of PBF has been shown to increase worker effort55, as well 
as reduce absenteeism.56 The study by Huillery and Seban showed that staff 
attendance reduced significantly following the withdrawal of PBF.16 It also 
reduced in the group where the fixed payment was removed but not to the same 
extent. We therefore hypothesise that withdrawal of donor funding will lead to 
reduced conscientiousness.
9
Pride (affective 
motivation)
Pride associated with working at the 
facility
Decrease
According to incentive theory, the introduction of financial rewards may ”crowd 
out” intrinsic motivation (which includes feelings of pride); this crowding out 
phenomenon is more likely when employees have high initial levels of intrinsic 
motivation, eg, when pride in one's work is high and the activity is interesting.57 
The evidence around this is contradictory with respect to PBF.58 For example, 
health workers in Bubanza province of Burundi claimed that PBF helped to 
generate pride and professionalism, while in another Burundian province, the 
PBF bonus was gradually perceived as a right and a fixed extra which may have 
led to less intrinsic motivation.59 In addition, the theory does not predict what 
happens to intrinsic motivation when the reward is withdrawn, If there is a 
shift in fundamental motivation composition caused by financial rewards, one 
may expect pride would remain low rather than increase on withdrawal of the 
reward.
4
Extrinsic motivation 
(cognitive 
motivation)
Importance health workers place on 
external rewards
Increase
The importance placed on external rewards by workers receiving PBF has been 
observed in other studies, and manifest through workers prioritising tasks linked 
to higher incentives,15,60,61 or gaming.15,62 Huillery and Seban also found that more 
attention was paid to financial motives relative to intrinsic motives following the 
withdrawal of PBF, and that this was not due to the decrease in worker salary.16 
Therefore, it is expected that extrinsic motivation would increase.
1
Sufficiency of 
income (affective 
motivation)
Degree to which health workers feel 
like their income is sufficient given 
their basic monetary needs
Decrease
Although there is no evidence on this from previous studies, it is expected that 
workers will perceive the sufficiency of income to be less following withdrawal 
of PBF, as workers would be expected to perform the same tasks for less money 
overall.
1
Income reflects 
effort (affective 
motivation)
Degree to which health workers feel 
income received reflects the amount 
of effort put into work
Decrease
Although there is no evidence on this from previous studies, it is expected that 
workers will likely perceive their (reduced) income as less appropriate in relation 
to effort following withdrawal of PBF, as workers would be expected to perform 
the same tasks for less compensation.
3
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Organisational level
Training (processes)
Satisfaction with training received and 
opportunities for training
No effect
The PBF scheme did not include training and so its withdrawal would not be 
expected to have an effect on workers’ satisfaction with training. Levels of 
training offered would be the same in the previous PBF and non-PBF groups.
3
Tasks (processes)
Satisfaction with workload and variety 
of tasks performed
No effect
The withdrawal of the PBF scheme was not accompanied by a change in service 
organisation or workload. Therefore, no difference in this dimension was 
expected between the previous PBF and non-PBF groups.
4
Availability of 
equipment/
Supplies (resources)
Satisfaction with availability of 
resources such as equipment, medical 
supplies and medications
No effect
The PBF scheme did not include increased equipment or supplies and so its 
withdrawal would not be expected to have an effect on workers’ satisfaction 
with the availability of equipment or supplies. The availability of equipment and 
supplies was not be expected to vary between the non-PBF and PBF groups. 
3
Organisational 
culture 
(organisational 
culture and 
human resources 
managementa)
Satisfaction with relationships with 
colleagues and management of the 
facility
Decrease
PBF has been shown to increase levels of collegial support in Mozambique.63 
The potential volatility of PBF was noted to be a source of stress for the heads 
of facilities in the DRC,16 so the withdrawal was anticipated to negatively affect 
health workers’ satisfaction with interpersonal relationships at work. PBF has 
recently been shown by some studies to improve supervision due to the levels 
of reporting and monitoring required.63,64 Therefore, it was plausible that this 
could reverse with the removal of PBF, potentially leading to lower levels of 
supervision.
4
Community level
Community 
relationships 
(consequence at 
community level)
Satisfaction with relationships with 
local leaders in the community
Decrease
In Rwanda, PBF was evaluated to have a positive effect on patient satisfaction,65 
which could improve community relationships with health providers. Yet, the 
presence of PBF did not have any impact on patient satisfaction according to 
Huillery and Seban’s study.16 Therefore, withdrawal either expected to have no 
effect, or result in lower satisfaction from the community. 
1
Outcomes Behaviour
Turnover intention 
(cognitive 
motivation)
Intention to leave the facility Increase
 Lack of satisfaction with salary (amongst other job aspects such as career 
opportunities) has been associated with higher turnover intention in a number 
of studies.66-68 Therefore, a reduction in income through PBF withdrawal would 
be likely to increase staff turnover intention.
1
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo. 
a Although the dimensions “Management” and “Organisational Culture” are treated as separate entities within the conceptual framework, they were merged together as items relating to management were worded in a way that they reflected 
organisational culture.
Link to Franco Framework Dimension (Link to Franco Framework) Description of Dimension
How Expected Withdrawal of 
the Donor-Funded Payment 
May Affect Dimension
Rationale No. of Items
Table 1. Continued
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evidence.
The dependent variable was the score on each dimension. 
Standard errors (SEs) were clustered at facility-level and 
ordinary least squares assumptions checked using regression 
diagnostics.
Qualitative Data
Qualitative data were collected in November 2014 in Kasai 
Occidental. Two health zones where workers had previously 
received PBF under the ATH programme were selected 
purposively, as well as another 2 health zones where workers 
had never received PBF. Two facilities in each health zone most 
easily accessible by road were then chosen by the researchers. 
One female and 1 male nurse were purposively selected from 
a single facility in each of the 4 health zones, as nurses are 
the main cadre present in primary care facilities.70 They were 
then interviewed subject to consent and meeting a further 
inclusion criterion, which was to have been based at the same 
facility for at least 1 year. Workers identified for interview 
in the non-PBF group were excluded if they had previously 
received PBF over the past 5 years. In-depth interviews were 
conducted using a semi-structured interview guide. As the 
purpose was to help further understand quantitative findings, 
perceptions and differences in the pre-identified dimensions 
of motivation were explored. The guide was pre-tested in a 
health centre before being finalised. The primary author (RM) 
and an experienced local qualitative researcher familiar with 
the cultural context performed all 16 interviews in French, 
and these were audio-recorded subject to participant consent. 
None of the respondents declined to participate. Interviews 
lasted one to 2 hours and were undertaken in a private room 
within facilities to maintain confidentiality.
Analysis
Audio recordings were transcribed in French by the local 
researcher to maximize accuracy and reviewed by RM, thus 
enabling both researchers to familiarise themselves with the 
data prior to coding. Nvivo 10 software was used to manage 
the qualitative data. Thematic analysis71,72 was employed using 
both deductive coding based on the dimensions measured 
in the quantitative analysis as codes, as well as inductive 
coding allowing the framework to evolve as interviews were 
analysed. RM and the local researcher independently initially 
coded the transcripts and then met for an analysis session 
which involved discussing the themes generated. During the 
analysis session, it was clear that the researchers’ individual 
interpretations of the transcripts were very similar; any 
differences that did occur were resolved by discussion. Results 
were than compared and contrasted for the previous PBF and 
non-PBF groups. In writing up the findings, RM translated 
quotes from French into English. 
Results
Quantitative Analysis
A total of 485 workers were interviewed and no one declined 
to participate in the survey. Three facilities did not meet 
the inclusion criteria as they were private facilities, and 
23 respondents were not classified as health workers. On 
elimination, this left 453 respondents from 202 facilities for 
analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics
The results of this study compare the PBF group with the 
non-PBF group; although the latter group comprised both 
ASSP and non-ASSP facilities, on testing for differences in 
characteristics, the only significant differences identified 
were at facility-level for provincial location and the number 
of services provided, as shown in Table 2. However, there 
were no differences between health worker characteristics. 
Given the ASSP programme had not fully commenced 
implementation when sampling occurred, it is not surprising 
that characteristics were broadly similar. Hence they were 
merged into one comparison group for analysis. Table 2 
presents the characteristics of sampled facilities, 36 of which 
were in areas where PBF had been operational. There were 
significant differences in the numbers of previous PBF and 
non-PBF facilities between provinces, as most of the previous 
PBF facilities were based in Maniema and the non-PBF 
facilities in Equateur. The majority of facilities were located in 
rural areas, with previous PBF facilities having a significantly 
higher number of personnel and offering more services 
compared to non-PBF facilities.
Most health workers surveyed were nurses and male 
(Table 3). The majority had attained either a primary or 
secondary level of school education and mean job tenure 
was almost 9 years. There were no significant differences in 
the composition of cadres working in previous PBF facilities 
compared to the non-PBF group, although previous PBF 
workers were significantly older and more likely to have had a 
university/post-secondary school education.
Comparison of Motivation Scores Between Previous PBF and 
Non-PBF Groups 
Mean and median composite scores for the dimensions of 
motivation overall and by PBF status are shown in Table 
4. The dimension ‘satisfaction with sufficiency of income’ 
had the lowest mean score, whereas the highest mean 
scores were observed for items related to the dimension 
‘level of conscientiousness.’ The largest difference in means 
between PBF groups was for ‘satisfaction with availability of 
equipment/supplies’ where the non-PBF group scored much 
higher. Mean and median scores for individual scale items are 
provided in the supplementary information (Table 1). 
Testing for mean differences using regression and 
controlling for health worker and facility characteristics 
as described in the methods, we found that health workers 
in previous PBF facilities scored significantly lower on all 
dimensions except ‘satisfaction with tasks’ (no significant 
differences) and ‘level of extrinsic motivation’ (marginally 
significantly higher scores) compared to those in non-PBF 
facilities. Table 5 summarises the regression results (separate 
models were run for each dimension).
Qualitative Findings
Sixteen nurses in total were interviewed; 8 in each PBF group, 
of which 4 were male and 4 were female. Ages of respondents 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Previous PBF and Non-PBF Facilities Sampled
Facility characteristics Total (n = 202) Non-PBF (n = 166) Previous PBF (n = 36) Test Statistic, P Value
Number of facilities 202 166 36
Facility location
Urban 14.8% 12.0% 25.0%
χ2 (1) = 5.10, P = .024
Rural 85.2% 88.0% 75.0%
Province
Equateur 33.7% 41.0% (ASSP: 52.3%, non-ASSP: 33.7%) 0.0%
χ2 (4) = 100.30, P < .0001
(Between non-PBF facilities: 
χ2 (4) = 39.22, P < .0001)
Kasai Occidental 28.2% 32.5% (ASSP: 47.7%, non-ASSP: 22.8%) 8.3%
Kasai Oriental 6.0% 7.2% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 11.9%) 0.0%
Maniema 17.3% 5.4% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 8.9%) 72.2%
Province Orientale 14.9% 13.9% (ASSP: 0%, non-ASSP: 22.8%) 19.4%
Type of facility
Health centre/health post 85.2% 85.5% 87.0%
χ2 (1) = 0.28, P = .598
Reference health centre 14.4% 14.5% 13.9%
Mean Mean, SE Mean, SE
Number of different services 
provided by facility (eg, antenatal 
care, vaccinations etc) (Total n = 
194, non-PBF = 160, PBF = 34)
6.97a
6.83 ± 0.13a
ASSP: 6.35 ± 1.50; 
non-ASSP: 7.16 ± 1.62
7.65 ± 0.22a
t = -2.76, P = .0064
(Between non-PBF facilities:
t = -3.22, P = .0015)
Total clinical staff present on the 
day
6.31 5.45 ± 0.32 10.28 ± 0.83 t = -6.09, P < .0001
Population catchment for area
(Total n = 163, non-PBF = 135, PBF 
= 28)
2710.31a 2725.64 ± 236.40a 2636.39 ± 431.04a t = 0.16, P = .8725 
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SE, standard error; ASSP, Access to Primary Health Care. 
a N less than total number of facilities for some variables due to missing values.
in each group were of similar ranges and those in previous PBF 
facilities had worked between 2 and 16 years at the facilities, 
while in the non-PBF group they had worked between one 
and 10 years. The sections that follow describe the process of 
PBF withdrawal and how it may have affected the individual, 
organisation and community, with due comparison to the 
non-PBF group where relevant.
Process of Performance-Based Financing Withdrawal
The key complaint from the previous PBF group around the 
process of withdrawing the PBF scheme was that it had been 
both abrupt and poorly communicated.
“When the new partner removed the prime (PBF scheme) 
we did not even know that they had removed the prime…we 
were not informed” [Respondent 1: Male 42 years, previous 
PBF].
This led to some resentment from workers in the previous 
PBF group towards the NGO implementing the ASSP 
programme. Workers also felt it was the responsibility of 
international partners to finance them, rather than that of the 
government. 
“For me, I would like it to be as before…I wish, there was 
another partner (NGO/donor) that can take care of us, so we 
can receive money at the end of each month” [Respondent 2: 
Female, 60 years, previous PBF].
Since the removal of the PBF scheme also coincided with 
a deliberate increase in the user fee tariff, this only served to 
magnify problems for health facilities. Nurses complained 
that the community had become used to the previous lower 
user fee tariff and so were less willing as well as less able to pay 
the new tariff. 
“Because people are already used to the free tariff…for 
them it’s a huge problem, even for the maternity here it was 
free, now it’s 1,500FC (1 USD), but for people to pay that, it’s 
becoming quite a problem” [Respondent 3: Female, 37 years, 
previous PBF].
Individual Health Worker Effects
“Extrinsic Motivation,” “Income Reflects Effort,” and “Conscientiousness”
When asked why nurses were motivated to work in their 
profession, few differences in responses were detected 
between the previous PBF and the non-PBF groups. Financial 
incentives appeared to be an important driver of motivation 
for a substantial share of the health workforce, irrespective of 
PBF. Against this general importance of financial incentives, 
respondents from the previous PBF group perceived that 
when they were receiving donor-funded payments, staff 
attendance at the facility was high, nurses worked hard and 
patients were treated in a timely way. 
“When we were paid, it stimulated us to work a lot and 
work well, we worked a lot, as we were paid, we had to be 
able to reach the percentage that was asked… we followed 
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the (performance) indicators” [Respondent 4: Female 27 
years, previous PBF].
Since the withdrawal of donor payments, workers confessed 
to putting less effort into their work. They reported high levels 
of staff absenteeism and admitted that they were less punctual 
in attending the facility, as they felt they were not receiving 
enough money. 
Respondent: “Before (when receiving PBF), I would work 
even if I had not eaten…Now (after PBF), I don’t work a lot. 
There are even health centres which do 10% out of 100%, 
they work only 10%....”
Interviewer: “Why do they not work a lot?”
Respondent: “Because of money” [Respondent 4: Female, 
27 years, previous PBF].
In particular, nurses felt the amount of effort required by 
the job was no longer sufficiently rewarded.
“With the work one does, it’s a tough job, you can be 
standing up for a long time during 2 or 3 hours and at 
the end of the month, what you receive, it’s not enough…” 
[Respondent 5: Female, 48 years, previous PBF].
Stories of corruption were frequent in both groups. Many 
workers shared tales of other workers stealing medications, 
equipment and medical supplies, which they then sold 
privately, and recounted examples of where patients had 
been overcharged for services. Irrespective of PBF group 
status, workers did not always see this as wrong, and some 
considered it justifiable in certain cases. There seemed to be 
no effect of PBF withdrawal in this regard. 
Table 4. Mean and Median Composite Scores for Dimensions of Motivation According to PBF Status
Dimension
Overall Non-PBF Previous PBF
Mean, SD (Median) Mean, SD (Median) Mean, SD (Median)
Level of conscientiousness 4.10, 0.32 (4.00) 4.13, 0.32 (4.00) 4.04, 0.30 (4.00)
Level of pride 4.02, 0.50 (4.00) 4.07, 0.49 (4.00) 3.87, 0.52 (4.00)
Satisfaction with training 3.50, 0.81 (3.67) 3.59, 0.78 (4.00) 3.26, 0.85 (3.33)
Satisfaction with tasks 3.61, 0.62 (3.75) 3.56, 0.64 (3.75) 3.74, 0.53 (4.00)
Satisfaction with availability of equipment/supplies 2.29, 0.93 (2.00) 2.47, 0.91 (2.33) 1.76, 0.78 (1.67)
Satisfaction with sufficiency of income 1.71, 0.65 (2.00) 1.79, 0.67 (2.00) 1.47, 0.55 (1.00)
Satisfied that income reflects effort 2.03, 0.74 (2.00) 2.17, 0.76 (2.00) 1.64, 0.49 (1.67)
Satisfaction with organisational culture 3.83, 0.55 (4.00) 3.87, 0.55 (4.00) 3.72, 0.55 (4.00)
Satisfaction with community relationships 4.00, 0.72 (4.00) 4.04, 0.74 (4.00) 3.91, 0.64 (4.00)
Level of turnover intention 3.00, 1.25 (4.00) 3.07, 1.21 (4.00) 2.82, 1.34 (3.00)
Level of extrinsic motivation 3.62, 1.07 (4.00) 3.50, 1.07 (4.00) 3.95, 0.99 (4.00)
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SD, standard deviation. 
Dimensions scored on scale from 1-5. A high mean or median score indicates a higher level for that dimension eg, higher pride. 
Table 3. Demographic Characteristics of Previous PBF and Non-PBF Health Workers
Characteristics Total (n = 453) Non-PBF (n = 335) Previous PBF (n = 118)
Test Statistic, 
P Value
Gender
Male 69.3% 70.2% 67.0% χ2 (1) = 0.14, P = .712
Female 31.7% 29.8% 33.0%
Education 
Primary/secondary school 60.7% 65.1% 48.3% χ2 (2) = 11.52, P = .003
University/post-secondary school 33.1% 29.6% 43.2%
Not specified 6.2% 5.4% 8.5%
Cadre
Doctor 0.9% 0.6% 1.7% χ2 (2) = 1.20, P = .549
Nurse 89.8% 90.2% 89.0%
Other clinical workers 9.3% 9.2% 9.3%
Mean Mean, SE N, Mean, SE
Age 40.01 39.41 ± 0.53 41.64 ± 0.87 t = -2.19, P = .029
Number of financial dependents
(Total n = 437, non-PBF = 320, PBF = 117)
8.87a 8.69 ± 0.26a 9.33 ± 0.38a t = -1.29, P = .1964  
Years worked in current position 
(Total n = 444, non-PBF = 327, PBF = 117)
8.93a   8.68 ± 0.46a 9.60 ± 0.87a t = 1.05, P = .2956
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; SE, standard error. 
a N less than total number of facilities for some variables due to missing values.
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“He is right because, for example, he has been working 
for 40 years at the centre…since he started working he has 
not even been recognised…by anyone or government…he is 
not paid … he has 8 children. …with the little he has…it is 
insufficient. He must pay for his rent, for his childrens’ school 
uniforms, to feed his children, why when in this manner he 
could take money (illegally) from the facility” [Respondent 
6: Male, 35 years, non-PBF].
“Sufficiency of Income”
The amount previously received under the PBF scheme 
had allowed workers to pay for their children’s school fees, 
save money and buy enough food to feed their family well. 
Following the withdrawal of the PBF scheme, the social 
circumstances of nurses dramatically changed. Many nurses 
started to borrow money from their relatives in order to 
continue to meet their own and their family’s basic needs.
“I managed, I sought help from my family to buy a few 
things to start selling in order to feed myself. With the money 
from my family, it is not my own money” [Respondent 7: 
Female, 28 years, previous PBF].
Workers in the non-PBF group felt the amount they received 
was insufficient, particularly those who had been working for 
several years but were still not salaried by the state. 
“I have worked for almost 3 years in this health centre, 
and I have never received a salary…which is why I am not 
happy…I only receive the user fees at the end of the month 
which we share between us” [Respondent 6: Male, 35 years, 
non-PBF].
“We work and then and the end of the month, we receive 
almost nothing” [Respondent 8: Female, 48 years, non-
PBF].
Nonetheless, they did not describe any instances of 
borrowing from other relatives or other behaviours to 
supplement income as described by the previous PBF group.
Organisation-Level Effects
“Organisational Culture”
The majority of workers in the previous PBF group found 
that their main source of revenue had shifted from PBF 
payments to user fees following the withdrawal of PBF. This 
was problematic insofar as the management and allocation of 
user fees had become a source of conflict since the withdrawal 
of the PBF scheme, despite what nurses described as generally 
good working relationships with their superiors. 
“We receive always the user fee because for example, you 
have 2 patients, you are 10 workers, you have to calculate the 
percentage, you will have how much? One can say you have 
5000 francs (4.5 USD)…How are you going to share that?” 
[Respondent 7: Female, 28 years, previous PBF].
Workers in non-PBF facilities where user fees had always 
been the main source of revenue, in contrast, seemed satisfied 
with the allocation of user fees.
“Management at the centre is good...there is transparency…
and the user fees are well managed” [Respondent 6: Male 35 
years, non-PBF].
“Turnover Intention”
Although the PBF scheme had initially attracted workers 
to facilities, shortly after it ceased, there was a mass exodus 
of workers. Some left clinical work completely to work in 
commercial activities. 
Respondent: “There was even a mutiny of other nurses 
who left the health zone”
Interviewer: “You know the number of nurses who left?”
Respondent: “Yes”
Interviewer: “How many?”
Respondent: “There were nearly 10 nurses in all of the 
health zone.”
Interviewer: “Why was there a mutiny?”
Respondent: “Because they were not receiving the prime 
(performance payment), they were going to stay to do what?” 
[Respondent 9: Male, 30 years, previous PBF].
Workers in the previous PBF group who stayed on in 
facilities stated this was either because: they had no other 
options of work available to them; they were waiting for 
another donor or NGO to start paying them; or they felt a 
strong commitment to their vocation and enjoyed working in 
Table 5. Summary of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Examining Associations Between PBF Removal and Scores on Motivation Dimensions
Factor β P Value 95% CI Constant Pseudo R2
Level of conscientiousness -0.20 <0.001c -0.31 to -0.10 3.76 0.12
Level of pride -0.43 <0.001c -0.61 to -0.25 3.67 0.10
Satisfaction with training -0.47 0.004c -0.78 to -0.15 3.74 0.11
Satisfaction with tasks -0.09 0.40 -0.29 to 0.12 3.33 0.07
Satisfaction with availability of equipment/supplies -0.62 <0.001c -0.95 to -0.29 2.51 0.19
Satisfaction with sufficiency of income -0.24 <0.047 b -0.48 to -0.00 2.15 0.10
Satisfied that income reflects effort -0.51 <0.001c -0.78 to -0.23 3.04 0.17
Satisfaction with organisational culture -0.23 0.020b -0.43 to -0.04 3.74 0.11
Satisfaction with community relationships -0.44 <0.001c -0.64 to -0.25 4.03 0.07
Level of turnover intention -0.49 0.045b -0.96 to 0.01 3.14 0.09
Level of extrinsic motivation 0.40 0.058a -0.01 to 0.80 3.19 0.07
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing. 
a P ≤ .1, b P ≤ .05, c P ≤ .01.
Controlled for health worker and health facility characteristics. Total number of observations for each regression was 392 due to missing values for certain 
characteristics.
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their profession.
“I am here because I love to treat people. If it wasn’t for 
my desire to work as a nurse, I would return to Katanga 
province, where life is better compared to here in Kasai” 
[Respondent 9: Male, 30 years, previous PBF].
Community-Level Effects
“Community Relationships”
As a result of the re-increase in user tariffs following the 
withdrawal of the PBF scheme, workers perceived that many 
patients were not attending the previous PBF facilities but 
were instead seeking care elsewhere, often from traditional 
healers or private facilities, or not at all. 
“Now to have money, to come to the centre, it’s always 
a problem, they take traditional medicines at home” 
[Respondent 4: Female, 27 years, previous PBF].
It also became clear during interviews that the effects 
associated with terminating the PBF scheme were not only 
influencing staff behaviour and motivation but were being 
felt by the community as well. For example, some nurses 
remarked that colleagues had become less welcoming and 
were even rude to patients since donor payments to workers 
had ceased. 
“They say even in front of the patients there, the patient 
comes, they say ‘no, leave there, I can’t treat you as I’m not 
paid’” [Respondent 9: Male 30 years, previous PBF].
Discussion
Based on existing conceptual and empirical work, we 
developed a scale to measure dimensions of motivation among 
health workers in the DRC. We then used this scale to assess 
differences in levels of motivation across each dimension for 
workers who had recently had PBF withdrawn with workers 
who had never received PBF, triangulating the results with 
the findings from qualitative interviews in order to shed more 
light on how the termination of a PBF scheme had affected 
worker motivation. 
The previous PBF group scored significantly lower on 
almost all motivation dimensions. Exceptions included 
‘satisfaction with tasks’ where there was no significant 
difference between groups, and ‘level of extrinsic motivation’ 
where workers in the previous PBF group scored higher 
(marginally significant). Theoretically, a more significant 
effect with the latter dimension may have been expected; 
according to “crowding out” theory; the introduction of 
monetary incentives may alter the composition of worker 
motivation, with workers becoming more driven by external 
rewards and less by intrinsic motivation.35,73 
Qualitative interviews indicated that financial compensation 
may have been an important dimension of motivation for 
both groups. The quantitative analysis showed that workers in 
the previous PBF group had significantly lower scores for the 
dimension ‘satisfaction with sufficiency of income.’ A likely 
reason behind the lower scores is that during PBF, workers 
were guaranteed a certain level of income each month (at 
least $75) but since the withdrawal of the PBF scheme, the 
amount received was less predictable as it was dependent on 
the amount of user fees collected; Fox et al found the monthly 
variation in user fees received by facilities in Katanga province 
of DRC to be considerable.26 A previous study by the authors 
examining the different income levels and sources of health 
workers using data from the same health worker and health 
facility surveys confirms that the income derived from user 
fees was on average much lower than the PBF payments.70 
However, despite some differences in the various sources of 
income received, the total mean and median income received 
for both the previous PBF and non-PBF groups were still 
similar (see Supplementary file 4, Table S4). 
Nonetheless, workers in the previous PBF group seemed 
unable to have the same lifestyle they had enjoyed before 
the withdrawal of PBF. Staff were unhappy with their lower 
level of compensation post PBF, leading to significantly 
lower scores on ‘satisfaction that income reflects effort’; their 
conscientiousness deteriorated as a result, with reports of high 
levels of staff absenteeism and poor attitudes towards patients. 
Such effects are potentially very destructive and undermine 
the effective functioning of the health system. The reasons for 
the significant differences between groups for the dimensions 
‘satisfaction with training,’ ‘satisfaction with tasks,’ ‘level 
of pride,’ and ‘satisfaction with availability of equipment/
supplies’ yielded by the quantitative analysis, however, could 
not be identified during qualitative interviews.
Although it could not be confirmed quantitatively, 
respondents described a reduction in the number of staff 
working in facilities following the cessation of incentives. Yet, 
contrary to interviews and the initial hypothesis, the previous 
PBF group scored lower on ‘level of turnover intention.’ The 
average tenure of workers in the previous PBF group was also 
not significantly different to that of the non-PBF group. It 
may be that those workers with a high turnover intention in 
the previous PBF group had already left facilities soon after 
PBF removal, so those interviewed were more committed 
to staying. Remaining staff had to rely on user fees received 
at the facility-level as their main source of income, the 
distribution of which was more often a source of dispute in 
previous PBF facilities compared to non-PBF facilities. This 
was perhaps because staff from non-PBF facilities had not 
experienced the same recent loss of income and so were well 
accustomed to the income received from user fees. In parallel, 
relationships between previous PBF workers and the local 
community became strained, as the implementing partners 
of ASSP had introduced higher user fees in order to help 
substitute performance payments. According to nurses in the 
previous PBF group, the community were less likely to access 
care from facilities as user fees had increased. Furthermore, 
in some workers, the resentment towards receiving a reduced 
income manifested itself in their attitudes towards patients. 
This breakdown in the interface between the community and 
health workers was consistent with the quantitative analysis 
where previous PBF workers had significantly lowers scores 
for ‘satisfaction with community relationships.’
The findings in this study do concur with another study in 
the DRC which found that the withdrawal of donor-funded 
payments did reduce the overall motivation of workers.16 
However, in this study we were able to measure differences 
between a group having had PBF withdrawn with a “control” 
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group across several different dimensions of motivation and 
employed in-depth qualitative investigation to yield a more 
in-depth understanding around the differences observed. 
There are few other reports in the wider literature which 
examine the withdrawal of donor-funded payments in 
relation to performance and motivation. A DFID-supported 
health programme in Liberia attempted to withdraw the 
payment of salary supplements to health workers. Following 
this, clinic staff began charging high fees for services and sold 
drugs to private clinics to enhance their income, necessitating 
the eventual reinstatement of financial incentives. Although 
anecdotes concerning unethical behaviour such as stealing 
were common in both groups in our study, it was likely to have 
been under-reported; given the small number of interviews 
conducted, we were unable to draw any strong conclusions 
as to whether this had changed in the previous PBF group. 
In the United States and United Kingdom, the cessation of 
performance payments did not appear to adversely affect 
performance or quality of care.74,75 Nevertheless, unlike 
this study, they were unable to indicate any differences 
observed with a control group. In addition, the contribution 
of performance payments compared to base salaries and 
other income sources is likely to be far lower in high-income 
countries compared with low-income countries, limiting the 
generalisability of the findings. 
The programme’s decision to terminate the PBF 
scheme was made on the premise that the government is 
responsible for public sector personnel remuneration, and 
that PBF funded by donors is not a sustainable solution. 
However, in the absence of any structural improvement in 
government payments to workers, immediate service needs 
still have to be met. Important lessons from this experience 
include: more careful thinking around the implications of 
withdrawing donor-funding for workers and their social 
circumstances, and ensuring that there is an effective 
communication strategy with workers and communities on 
such programmatic changes to mitigate any adverse reactions. 
Alternative, acceptable measures should also be instituted 
which still make it attractive for workers to stay and provide 
high quality services at facilities. As indicated by previous 
studies, workers are not exclusively motivated by financial 
factors.8 Attention to non-financial dimensions such as the 
‘satisfaction with the availability of equipment/supplies’ and 
‘satisfaction with training’ which were rated low in this study 
could serve to enhance motivation. Country governments 
and their international health partners should also consider 
whether the short-term advantages of introducing additional 
health worker payments outweigh the potential adverse long-
term consequences if the chances of it being sustained in the 
long-term for a given context are low. In designing any future 
PBF schemes, a realistic and well thought out exit strategy 
should be planned from the beginning to prevent long-
term dependence, and the existing financial environment of 
workers should also be reviewed to ensure that payments are 
not distortionary in the context of other payments received. 
For example, one way of ensuring PBF is more structurally 
and financially sustainable, is to blend it with other existing 
payment mechanisms (such as salaries)76 as opposed to 
implementing it as a stand-alone, vertical programme, as was 
the case here. Another study in the DRC found that health 
workers appeared to value salaries more than PBF payments,26 
and so efforts to ensure all legitimate workers are remunerated 
by the state should be prioritised.77 Furthermore, with respect 
to PBF, donors may consider what specific sources of funds 
would be used for a PBF scheme in the event their funding 
cannot be sustained. 
A strength of this study is that it supplemented the 
quantitative data with qualitative insights in order to 
corroborate and explain findings. We developed a motivation 
measurement scale customised to workers in the DRC, which 
may be of use to future studies wishing to measure the effects 
of different interventions on motivation. In doing so, we chose 
a proxy-based approach to operationalising motivation, in 
line with many prior studies. We acknowledge, however, that 
such an approach relies on a number of assumptions about 
relationships between proxies and motivation itself about 
which we cannot be fully certain.
There were several limitations to the study, the main 
limitation being it was a cross-sectional study making it 
difficult to causally attribute the lower motivation levels 
observed in the previous PBF group to the cessation of the PBF 
scheme. It is possible that the findings demonstrate that the 
results of PBF are not sustained when funds are withdrawn, 
and that motivation levels in this group had returned to 
baseline levels (pre-PBF). Workers from previous PBF 
facilities also had some significantly different characteristics 
compared to non-PBF workers; in particular, many of the PBF 
and non-PBF workers were located in facilities in different 
provinces. Therefore, the differences in context could also 
explain some of the differences in motivation observed. This 
was unavoidable as coverage of the PBF model was determined 
by the geographical focus of the previous health programme. 
To the extent possible differences in characteristics were 
controlled for in the quantitative analysis, however. 
By the time the quantitative and qualitative data were 
collected, performance payments had stopped for one month 
and 8 months respectively. According to interviews, many of the 
original workers had subsequently left following the removal 
of PBF. Stronger reactions may therefore have been observed 
had interviews occurred immediately after the withdrawal, 
however, of concern is that discontent persisted amongst 
the previous PBF group long afterwards. Furthermore, the 
study was unable to disentangle the influence of removing the 
fixed payment from the performance-based component. This 
was investigated previously by Huillery and Seban, where 
they found the removal of a performance-related payment 
compared with a fixed payment of the same amount had a 
more profound negative impact on motivation.16 
The study was subject to other biases, including social 
desirability bias where respondents’ perceptions of what 
constitutes an acceptable answer or what they think the 
researcher wishes to hear may have influenced their responses. 
The analysis could have been strengthened had we been able 
to link the motivation scores to performance, however data 
on the latter was not captured. Due to resource constraints, 
qualitative interviews were only conducted in one province so 
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may not be generalisable to the other sampled provinces. Kasai 
Occidental province was chosen because it would be easiest to 
access both workers who had either previously been exposed 
to the PBF model or never received PBF. However, a limitation 
is that the number of qualitative interviews undertaken overall 
was small. Although there are no established guidelines on 
sample sizes for qualitative interviews, the literature suggests 
between 20 and 50 interviews are often needed.78,79 We were 
limited in the number of interviews possible by the realities 
of a very difficult context (security, accessibility, availability 
of staff). 
Finally, our confidence in comparing scores for dimensions 
exhibiting strong measurement invariance across PBF groups 
was higher compared to those constructs which showed weak 
or no invariance; the small sample of workers in the previous 
PBF groups would have affected the precision of measurement 
invariance testing.33 
Conclusion
Programmes unable to sustain donor-funded payments to 
health workers should consider the consequences withdrawal 
could have for health worker motivation, and institute 
measures to mitigate against any adverse effects. Governments 
and donors designing new PBF schemes should develop 
realistic exit strategies if they are unlikely to be able to sustain 
these schemes over the longer-term.
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